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Abstract

MOVEMENT WITHOUT MOTION: THE RHETORIC OF CONSERVATIVE
COUNTER-CLAIMS TO GLOBAL WARMING THEORY
By William J. Edwards Jr., BA
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in
English, Writing and Rhetoric, at Virginia Commonwealth University.

Virginia Commonwealth University, 2010
Thesis Director: David J. Coogan
Assistant Professor, Department of English
Virginia Commonwealth University
Richmond, Virginia

Many U.S. conservatives view government mandates to reduce emissions of greenhouse
gases as a threat to the economy of the developed world. Conservative think tanks have adopted
a common rhetoric to instill doubt about proposed mandates in the minds of elected officials, the
media, and the public. Using a survey of the websites of 14 conservative think tanks, this thesis
analyzes counter-claims to global warming theory to identify rhetorical artifacts that typically
characterize conservative responses to issues, and to show how rhetorical theory can help
anticipate the nature of such responses. The research identifies unifying speech codes – such as

ideographs and commonplaces – that provide the conservative movement’s appeal. The
conclusion is that conservative counter-claims to global warming theory are an application of
longstanding principles in a new and transformative way; and that the conservative movement is
actually a “new social movement” as described by rhetorical theorists.
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A MOVEMENT WITHOUT MOTION: THE RHETORIC OF CONSERVATIVE
COUNTER-CLAIMS TO GLOBAL WARMING THEORY
by
William J. Edwards Jr.
Political formation is best discovered
through an analysis of words in action.
– Hattam and Lowndes, 2007
Introduction
Faithful viewers of the conservative talk show, The Glenn Beck Program, might have
done a double take on July 18, 2007 when Beck admitted on FOX Network television
that he believed planet Earth actually could be getting warmer.
“I do believe in global warming. I’m not sure if man is causing it, but I am willing
to listen to that side and be convinced of that,” Beck told his audience as he opened a Fox
News network interview with noted environmental activist Robert F. Kennedy Jr. (The
Glenn Beck Program).
For years, Beck had been a vocal skeptic of both the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change’s consensus statement on climate change, which recognized global
warming as a manmade problem, and of policy actions outlined in the 1997 Kyoto
Protocol as ways to stem anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.
In the late 1990s and first several years of this century, Beck and other right-wing
commentators were fairly united in their questioning of the evidence for global warming.
Conservative think tanks supported their opposition to the Kyoto proposals with
arguments that raised doubts about the validity of climate science in general, and about
the link of global warming to human causes, according to hundreds of documents posted
1

on websites of conservative think tanks (McCright and Dunlap, “Challenging Global
Warming”).
Did Beck’s seeming change of view on global warming signify a new trend in the
views of his fellow members of the conservative movement? Were the same people who
had been arguing that climate change science was “junk science” and that evidence of
global warming was weak, if not completely wrong, now willing to accept the consensus
view and join those who were working to limit the production of greenhouse gases and
slow the rate of climate change?
Apparently not. Beck went on to argue that even if he were to be convinced that
greenhouse gases generated by human activity are causing climate change, and that
climate change could cause serious problems for mankind, he still doubts that the policy
changes recommended by the Kyoto Protocol would solve the problem. Instead, he
continues to support the conservative view that mandated limits to production of
greenhouse gases will wreak havoc on the U.S. economy.
Beck’s revised position on global warming did reflect a change in the rhetoric of
conservatives on the issue global warming, however. By the time of Beck’s broadcast in
2007, more conservative analysts were agreeing openly that global climate change was a
real phenomenon – many more than had conceded this point a decade earlier. In a study
published in 2000 by Washington State University sociologists Aaron M. McCright and
Riley E. Dunlap, the researchers reported that they had surveyed more than 275 global
warming documents posted on the websites of 14 conservative think tanks between 1990
and 1997, and they outlined three main arguments used to cast doubt on global warming
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theory: 1) that the evidence of global warming is weak, if not wrong; 2) that global
warming will be beneficial if it does occur; and 3) that proposed actions to limit global
warming will do more harm than good (McCright and Dunlap, “Challenging Global
Warming” 510. See also, Table 1).
McCright and Dunlap conclude that the emergence of three counter-claims as the
dominant, shared arguments against measures to ameliorate anthropogenic global
warming constituted a new counter-movement that had emerged just before the turn of
the 21st century. Referencing previous work on movement theory within the discipline of
sociology (Mottl, Vander Zanden, Zald and Useem, Benford and Snow), they argued that
the phenomenon of the development of these three conservative counter-claims fits
Mottl’s definition of a countermovement as “a particular kind of protest movement which
is a response to a social change advocated by an initial movement” (Mottl 623).
McCright and Dunlap state that previous sociological research on global warming
focused on the issue as a social problem, which “produced an inadequate understanding
of the global warming controversy” (McCright and Dunlap, “Challenging Global
Warming” 501). Instead, viewing the phenomenon of the global warming counter-claims
as a movement or a counter-movement enables the two sociologists to see the
phenomenon more as part of an interactive process of framing the controversy undertaken
by multiple stakeholders – providing “more leverage for understanding the underlying
structures of power in which social problems discourse is embedded”, and to
“conceptualize the recent global warming controversy in the United States as a framing
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contest between the environmental establishment and the conservative movement”
(McCright and Dunlap, “Challenging Global Warming” 503).
This approach to analysis of the global warming controversy provides a revealing
image of two powerful forces going head-to-head in a “war of language” with potentially
devastating consequences.
On one side of this conflict, the combatants might be said to view “global frame
of environmental problems [as] the ‘schemata of interpretation’ that enables us to
perceive that for the first time in history, humans are disrupting the global ecosystem in
ways that affect, not only ‘environmental quality,’ but also the current and future wellbeing of our species”; on the other side, opponents might be said to view governmental
pursuit of environmental protection “as threatening core elements of conservatism, such
as the primacy of individual freedom, private property rights, laissez-faire government,
and promotion of free enterprise” (McCright and Dunlap, “Challenging Global
Warming” 504).
In the McCright-Dunlap study, the opposition to global warming is ultimately
described as part of a conservative environmental counter-movement, and the success of
the anti-environmental rhetoric employed in this counter-movement is undeniable. In a
follow-up study in 2003, McCright and Dunlap look at the impacts of this rhetoric on the
media, public opinion and subsequent attempts to implement measures to limit warming,
concluding that “a major reason the United States failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol to
ameliorate global warming was the opposition of the American conservative movement, a
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key segment of the anti-environmental countermovement” (McCright and Dunlap,
“Defeating Kyoto” 349).
This approach is based largely on sociological theory of movements, which
practitioners in that discipline say has been advanced mostly in Europe. Social movement
theory is distinguished from social problems theory, which has predominated American
sociological research. Sociologist Harry Bash, one of the pioneers of movement theory in
America, writes that both approaches were developed in response to the Industrial
Revolution as ways to explain essentially the same phenomenon: social change resulting
from collective action. Bash differentiates the two merely by associating social problems
theory more with ahistorical research and social movement theory more with the history
of “people engaged in concerted action that is intended to have some sort of impact on
the prevailing socio-cultural arrangement.” (Bash 11)
Bash does acknowledge the evolution of movement theory in the sociological,
political and rhetorical disciplines when he adds that both views are merely “conceptions
of perceptions” that are not themselves “empirically evident” (Bash 9).
[N]either problems nor movements constitute observables per se but,
rather, must be recognized as alternative interpretations of observable
phenomena … as distinctive social constructions of reality. (Bash 163)
His attitude is that linking the two approaches together is more important than splitting
them apart, because what really matters is the analysis of social change. Other
sociologists, including Doug McAdam, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, editors of an
often-cited 1996 text on social movements, Comparative Perspectives on Social

5

Movements, expanded this view. In their introduction to this work, the three characterize
all movement scholars in sociology as increasingly emphasizing the same three points in
their research and in the discussions of their findings (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 2):
1) the structure of political opportunities and constraints confronting
the movement;
2) the forms of organization (informal as well as formal) available to
insurgents; and
3) the collective process of interpretation, attribution, and social
construction that mediate between opportunity and action.
One might argue that any or all of these factors in a social movement – opportunities,
constraints, organization, interpretation, attribution and social construction – depend on
rhetoric to become real. But surely, interpretation, attribution and social construction are
inextricably bound to language, and this is where sociologists, political scientists and
rhetoricians admit that the lines separating their disciplines get hazy.
In their study of three social movements in the 20th century, “The Ground Beneath
Our Feet: Language, Culture, and Political Change,” political scientists Victoria Hattam
and Joseph Lowndes argue that certain linguistic changes, especially changes that
establish new social identities for participants in the political process, result in “shifts in
meaning that reverberate through political identifications and alliances in the most
profound fashion.” Hattam and Lowndes, often-quoted experts on the “Tea Party”
movement, assert that in politics, shifts in identity occur long before any shift in political
power is apparent.
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Interest and identities are not given in advance, with politics relegated to
the task of distribution. Rather, who we are, what we want, and how we
might satisfy our desires are produced and reproduced discursively over
time. If we want to understand political change, we need to attend to
discourse, since this is where political identification and social cleavages
are made and remade. (Hattam and Lowndes 203-204)
By identifying and outlining the key counter-claims against global warming theory,
McCright and Dunlap help isolate the discursive strategies of what they describe as the
environmental counter-movement in American politics – as witnessed through the
statements of conservative think tanks. But now that many think tanks have abandoned
what appeared to be their most crucial argument, that global warming doesn’t exist, what
can we learn from this development? Has the environmental counter-movement ceased to
exist? Did it ever exist? Or has it evolved into something new and unprecedented?
These questions may be appropriate for further sociological studies based on
social movement theory within that discipline, but a useful way to supplement our
knowledge of the global warming controversy is to analyze these arguments from a
rhetorical perspective – following the lead of Hattam and Lowndes by looking at how the
words of the discourse are used and how those words provide new social identities and
link together the adherents of the conservative movement.
If the real purpose of the political process is to make wise decisions about issues
that will impact our future, then perhaps the better question to ask is: What can the
language of the global warming controversy tell us about members of movements on both
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sides of the issue, about the political institutions involved, and about how each group is
likely to approach decision-making on environmental issues?
In this thesis, I will investigate how one movement’s rhetorical codes may have
influenced its members to adopt certain ways of speaking about global warming. But to
understand how rhetoric can influence identities, meaning and action, one must first
examine how movement theory has developed within the rhetorical discipline – with
particular emphasis on the concept of “new social movements” and how that concept has
provided methods for analyzing social change agents.
Movement Theory in the Rhetorical Realm
Although the term “social movement” is generally acknowledged as originating within
the discipline of sociology in the mid-1900s, it wasn’t long after the birth of movement
studies in sociology that rhetoricians began to focus on the role of language in the
formation of the “collective identities” – as described by sociologist Alberto Melucci –
that enable people to act collectively (as movements) against repression (Melucci 132).
As early as the 1950s, eminent rhetorical scholars such as Kenneth Burke recognized how
a speaker’s interaction with his or her audience often involves more than the mere act of
persuading someone else to perform a specific action; that social action can arise from
shared identity between speaker and audience.
Through the explanation of his “dramatistic theory,” Burke describes a process
that greatly widens the meaning of persuasion “to see behind it the conditions of
identification or consubstantiality.” Writing that “the rhetorician may have to change an
audience’s opinion in one respect, but he can succeed only insofar as he yields to that
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audience’s opinions in other respects,” Burke provided almost inarguable evidence of the
essential role of rhetoric in the formation of movements (Burke 54-56). He even
foreshadowed the concept of “new social movements,” which underlies the transition of
rhetorical movement studies from its traditional focus on the history of social phenomena
associated with movement to a focus on rhetoric as the progenitor of meaning and
identity in movements.
One of Burke’s contemporaries, Richard McKeon, seems to have been having
similar visionary thoughts when, in 1957, he characterized “a society as composed of
social actors who are of one mind in the truth, which is constituted discursively, without
being of one opinion” (McKeon 90). In other words, one wonders whether McKeon’s
word “society” in this sentence could now be replaced with the phrase “new social
movement,” which Gerard Hauser and Susan Whalen would in 1997 describe as almost
in every way “rhetorically constituted” (Hauser and Whalen 439).
Regardless, by the time Burke published The Rhetoric of Motives in 1950,
scholars of rhetoric were beginning to take movement studies quite seriously. Burke’s
theory gave almost equal significance to the rhetor’s audience, an idea that began to
permeate movement studies immediately and would become well-accepted by the 1960s
and 1970s. Prior to the 1950s, rhetorical criticism concentrated mainly on individual
speeches and selected groups of speeches, and these rhetorical artifacts were analyzed
mostly in a historical context from the perspective of how the words had influenced
specific societal changes (Brockriede 291-292).
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In April 1952, Leland M. Griffin broke this tradition when he published an article
titled, “The Rhetoric of Historical Movements.” Griffin outlined a new formula for the
rhetorical study of movements. Rather than being statisticians of movements, Griffin
wrote, rhetoricians should focus on being “literary historians” who, once they identify the
historical movement to target in their research, should endeavor to “isolate the rhetorical
movement within the matrix of the historical movement.” (Griffin, “Rhetoric of
Historical Movements” 184) Griffin prescribed three steps for success in such endeavors:
1) Identify patterns of discussion; 2) describe the configuration of the discourse taking
place; and 3) characterize the physiognomy of persuasion in the rhetorical movement
(Griffin, “Rhetoric of Historical Movements” 186).
Griffin put his formula to work, publishing two rhetorical movement studies – one
on the anti-masonic movement of the early 1800s, and another on the emergence of the
“New Left” – that became models for a new direction in movement studies. Later, Griffin
would depart even farther from the historical approach, publishing an article
incorporating elements of Burke’s dramatistic theory as a substitute for the traditional
historical approach.
During the next three decades, rhetoricians who began to march under the banner
of movement studies – and even some critics of the approach – were writing about how
the discourse occurring within a social movement was an ongoing process that
constructed and reconstructed the reality of the movement for its adherents. If the success
of rhetorical persuasion is enhanced by a give-and-take between rhetor and audience, as
Burke suggested, then there must be something going on that involves a change of
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identity for everyone involved – that a rhetorical situation, at least sometimes, creates
something new, and, that this new phenomenon sometimes becomes a “new” movement.
Although rhetoricians and sociologists were making greater distinctions between
their approaches during the 1970s and 1980s, movement studies for both disciplines
began to evolve slowly along parallel paths.
The Speech Communication Association (now the National Communication
Association) in 1971 published The Prospect of Rhetoric, a collection of essays and
articles that had been assembled for the association’s National Development Project on
Rhetoric. More than 40 scholars contributed to the project, presenting papers at two
conference meetings during 1970, and the association ultimately included 18
presentations in its final report. Although none of the articles focused on movement
studies per se, some of the discussions seemed to be setting the stage for new methods of
study that would focus more on the role of rhetoric in engaging audiences as agents of
change, and emphasizing the role of rhetoric in instilling the sense of belonging and
shared values that characterize the collective identity of most social movements.
In his SCA essay titled “The New Rhetoric,” Chaim Perelman proposed that
effective rhetoric must focus on the relationship between speakers and listeners; that it
must combine basic elements drawn from Aristotle’s Topics, which emphasizes that a
particular audience will have generally accepted opinions, and from Rhetoric, which
emphasizes the reasoning that must be applied by a speaker who is aware of the opinions
of the audience.
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The social aspect of rhetoric makes it easier to understand the attitude of all
kinds of protesters and contestants who cannot find in the established order
adequate means to obtain a hearing … The great speaker knows his
audience. He knows the values to which they adhere and to what extent, and
the arguments they accept and those they question … In political discourse,
recourse is had to commonplaces, to the common beliefs and interests of the
audience. Hence the psychology of the listeners, their beliefs, prejudices and
passions play an all-important part. (Perelman 120)
Wayne Brockriede, in his SCA essay on trends in rhetoric, noted that the discipline had
reached far beyond the traditional concept of a “speaker constructing a persuasive
discourse to influence other people.” Although persuasion is still one of the principal
purposes of rhetoric, Brockriede opines, viewing it as the only function of rhetoric
severely limits the study of interactions of people and ideas. “Some of the other
dimensions of rhetoric, to mention a few, are to aim at identification, at alienation, at
adaptation, at self-discovery, at interaction, and at the development or maintenance of a
group (Brockriede 125).
Foreshadowing another trend in rhetoric studies that would account for a much
larger share of research in the 1990s, Samuel L. Becker urged participants in the SCA
conference to undertake “more historical and critical studies which provide data on that
communication which operates to prevent rather than bring about change … additional
studies which provide data on communications which serves an ego-defense function, or
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a value-expressive function, or a knowledge function – which serves the needs of
individuals to give structure to their universe (Becker 23).
At the same time, Wayne Booth warned those in his discipline about some of the
dangers of giving too little attention to the classic, persuasive influence of rhetoric.
Although studying the rhetorical artifacts of a particular group of people with common
beliefs and goals (sometimes constituting a movement) can provide insight into the nature
of the group, it may not tell us much about the potential of the group for influencing the
world outside. Too often, Booth argues, “[t]he temptation is to a self-satisfied expose of
the opponent’s fallacies and absurdities, without making the slightest effort to ‘move into
his circle of assumption’ and argue from there” (Booth. “Prospect of Rhetoric” 97).
Booth says this is true both for people who use rhetoric and for the people who study
them.
Booth and Perelman believed rhetoric pervades every level of human experience.
They advocated marrying the approaches of all disciplines in rhetorical research, and in
the decades since the SCA report, it became clear they meant this broad view method
should apply to movement studies. As the 1970s progressed, movement studies continued
to gain respect in the sociological and rhetorical disciplines. French sociologist Alain
Touraine described movements not as peripheral phenomena, but as “the fabric of
society,” a social structure that is key to analysis and understanding of all kinds of other
societal structures (Sennett ix).
But Touraine’s idea of structure was not concrete. He wrote that movements are
not defined by their objectives, but by the identities they assume, based largely on the
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struggles they undertake: “The social movement is the organized collective behavior of a
class actor struggling against his class adversary for the social control of historicity in a
concrete community” (Touraine 71). Movements produce ideologies, and often, Utopias,
both of which become identified with what is at stake in the struggles, and ultimately,
with the history of their times. Although Touraine viewed social movements as loosely
structured and dynamic, he differentiated them from other forms of group action and
from social problems by outlining four conditions that must be met: 1) a movement must
undertake its activities in the name of a committed population; 2) a movement’s beliefs
must be organized and integrated (not merely opinion); 3) a movement must identify its
adversaries; and 3) the conflict must not be specific, but a social problem that affects all
of society (Touraine 79).
In some respects, Touraine’s view was both modern and traditional. He saw each
movement as having a beginning (usually a spontaneous protest), a middle (in which the
movement becomes at least loosely organized), and an end (often a confrontation that
leads to a transformation) (Touraine 77). Griffin took a similar view, but defined the
stages more from his rhetorical point of view as: inception, rhetorical crisis, and
consummation (Griffin “On Studying Movements” 225). Clearly, both sociologists and
rhetoricians were emphasizing many of the same aspects in explaining their theories on
movements – the importance of collective identity; the importance of language and
ideology; and the ability of movements to create meaning.
Robert Cathcart, a rhetorician, acknowledged the contributions of sociology to
movement studies, but argued that only rhetorical definition of movements would work
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for rhetoricians. Cathcart stressed Burke’s dramatistic theory, writing that movements
contain dialectic tension that arises from moral conflict, and that “[i]t is this reciprocity or
dialectical enjoinment in the moralist arena which defines movements and distinguishes
them from other dramatistic forms.” (Cathcart “New Approaches…” 87) In the ensuing
decades, the argument over cross-disciplinary study of movement continued, but few
deny the influence that the various disciplines have exerted on each other. Movement
studies were becoming a significantly larger share of the work done in both disciplines.
In winter 1980, the Central States Speech Journal published an entire issue devoted to the
subject, based on the organization’s annual conference, with contributions from leading
scholars such as Cathcart, Griffin, McGee, Simons, Lucas and Zarefsky. Lucas’s
contribution opened with a challenge:
We have reached the end of the first generation of movement studies by
rhetorical scholars. Although few such studies existed prior to 1965, better
than two hundred have been published in the last fifteen years. Yet our
understanding of the rhetoric of social movements remains essentially
epiphanic … we have yet to develop much systematic research or
theory-building about how rhetoric functions in the inception, progress,
and culmination of social movements. (Lucas 255)
After a decade of study, Griffin remained faithful with his advice to rhetorical scholars, to
look for rhetorical movements occurring within historical movements, which he
described as an “evolving sequence of discourse” that plays out in a movement. He also
praised the members of his discipline for broadening the scope of movement studies to
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include such concepts as “innovational movements” (Smith and Windes 142),
“establishment movements” (Zarefsky 246), and “mythic analysis” (Solomon 263).
Many authors who presented at the CSSJ conference addressed the challenge of
defining rhetorical movements, and in doing so foreshadowed emergence of the term
“new social movement,” which would come into common usage more than a decade
later. The scholars focused on a problem generated by sociological movement studies,
which they say had been too narrowly defined.
Michael McGee described movements not as phenomena, but rather as meanings
created by the discourse of the participants, and he predicted that the rhetoric of social
movements might become “a distinctive theoretical domain, but only as a theory of
human consciousness. (“Social Movement…” 233)” A theory of movement “must
determine the identity and meaning of the consciousness which inspires us, as citizens
and scholars, to seek and see ‘movement’ when we look at historical and social facts.
(“Social Movement…” 242)” He advises scholars that
We will not say a “movement” exists or has occurred until we can
demonstrate by a survey of public discourse that descriptions of the
environment have changed in common usage in such a way as to make
“movement” an arguably acceptable term useful in formulating the chain
of facts we believe to have constituted real change. (“Social Movement…”
242)
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In short, McGee might say that a political party is an observable phenomenon, but a
movement is a set of meanings that can best be studied by analyzing the language used to
express those meanings.
Cathcart expresses respect for McGee’s conclusion that meaning is paramount in
movement analysis, and agrees with McGee and Griffin that movements are recognized
by the rhetorical interactions taking place:
A movement does not “move” in the objective world. It can only be
interpreted through bits and pieces of behavior and “created” by the
symbolic form and meaning these verbal and non-verbal behaviors to on
in relationship to already established symbolic forms and meanings.
(Cathcart “Defining Social Movements…” 268)
But Cathcart’s view is more realistic than McGee’s, in that he recognizes that movements
exist in space and time, that they have members, leaders and even a certain level of
organization. And he says the material aspects of movements can have symbolic meaning
as well. Rhetorically, movements are created when the language of the group seeking
change clashes with the language of the established social hierarchy. Although the
language changes periodically, it is structured and orderly enough to give members “a
sense of place, a sense of belonging, and a direction for the future. (“Defining Social
Movements…” 269)”
Cathcart also stresses the importance of whether a group of people seeking change
engage in dialectical discourse – which he describes as “rhetorical confrontation” – with
the established social order. If not, then the group is not likely to be viewed as a
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movement. Likewise, if a group recognized as a social movement cannot maintain
confrontation with the establishment, then it may cease to exist. “Movements gain
strength and power mainly through their ability to create doubts about the legitimacy and
morality of the establishment. They grow not so much by direct recruitment as by the
ability to get the public to withhold support for the system. (“Defining Social
Movements…” 273)”
During the 1960s through the 1980s, rhetorical theorists in movement studies
attempted to isolate a class of rhetoric that could be uniquely associated with social
movements, but the reviews of those efforts were mixed. In his 1980 essay titled, “A
Skeptical View of Movement Studies,” David Zarefsky questions the validity of the
prevailing theoretical approaches, concluding that most had failed to produce much of
value. Zarefsky advocated returning to a more down-to-earth approach of studying
movements from an historical perspective – the approach that most sociologists and some
rhetoricians had continued to use. Zarefsky just didn’t see much to gain by isolating
movement studies within the disciplines; he wrote that “the reason to study the
movement’s rhetoric is not that a distinct class of rhetoric will thereby be identified.
Instead, the reason is that the movement had, or failed to have, historical significance,
and that our understanding of history will be enhanced by its rhetorical dimension.
(Zarefsky 253). At the time of his writing (and perhaps still), Zarefsky saw the rhetorical
historian as one whose work complements the work of other scholars who examine the
sociological, economic, political, and cultural dimensions of human activities (256).
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Another possibility scholars ignored during the CSSJ conference in 1980 was that
rhetorical movement analysis might have just been immature at that time, and that the
sub-discipline of movement studies could evolve into something that would enable
scholars to contribute more to our understanding of history without having to abandon
their theories about the uniqueness of the rhetoric of movements. And in fact, by the mid1990s, new theories did emerge.
New Rhetoric and New Social Movements
Scholars in the second half of the 20th century began to recognize that some of the new
socio-political activities of the 1960s resembled social movements, but did not quite fit
the models that had been devised to explain activities such as the Labor Movement, the
Civil Rights Movement and even Nazism. Disciples of traditional collective behavior
theories often viewed these new social movements, also called liberatory movements, as
merely irrational activities. Others, initially from the sociological discipline, responded
with a new theory. In Europe, led by Melucci and Touraine, social movement scholars
developed a new strand of scholarship that became known as new social movement
studies. “In mass, they tend[ed] to examine movements that are less inclined to agitate
directly for political transformation than to challenge cultural norms and hegemonic
practices that influence identity formation.” (Malesh 9)
Melucci himself tended to focus on changes in society that he believed caused a
shift in the nature of social movements. He considered new social movements as mainly
post-industrial phenomena, and attributed their self-identity focus to the emergence of the
information age. Melucci writes that the ability to access and disseminate information so
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easily has created an ironic “dual articulation of autonomy and dependence” that works
perfectly for movements of this type.
The techno-scientific apparatus, the agencies of information and
communication, and the decision-making centers that determine policies,
wield their power over their domains. Yet, these are precisely the areas
where individuals and groups lay claim to their autonomy, where they
conduct their search for identity by transforming them into a space where
they reappropriate, self-realize, and construct the meaning of what they are
and what they do. (Melucci 105)
Melucci, who is often credited with introducing the term “new social movement” in
1980, argues that the ability to act, or wield power, is no longer based on material
resources or on the way a movement is organized, but rather on the movement’s ability to
produce information. Not only that, he suggests that rhetoric might be even more
important to new social movements because new movements tend to address conflicts in
ways that recast language and cultural codes. “In fact, action by a new social movement
may consist of nothing more than production of a cultural code,” a system of symbols and
meaning that are relevant mainly to insiders (110).
New social movement scholars on both sides of the Atlantic emphasized the
importance of identity constructions in social movement framing activities. Identity
constructions within movements link individuals and groups ideologically, as well as
create, strengthen and maintain identities that are collaborative and conflictual
(Hunt 187).
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Though [new social movements] may have no clear class or structural
base, the movement becomes the focus for the individual’s definition of
himself or herself, and action within the movement is a complex mix of
the collective and individual confirmations of identity. (Johnson 8)
Naturally, when theories of new social movements entered the realm of rhetorical
scholars, they gained more meaning for the purpose of further study in that discipline.
Two key proponents of this branch of theory in rhetoric have been Gerard A. Hauser and
Susan Whalen, both professors of communication at the University of Colorado at
Boulder. Hauser and Whalen write that they are interested specifically in “rhetorically
formed” social movements. “New social movement rhetoric centers on the problem of
loss of identity and the need for engagement in the redemptive discourses of selfdiscovery” (Whalen and Hauser 443).
But although Whalen and Hauser are comfortable with prescribing a new rhetoric
for analysis of new social movements, they acknowledge the contributions of sociology,
early 20th century rhetorical scholars, and ancient philosophies of rhetoric to this recent
invention. The new rhetoric is something of a paradox because it “both shares and
disavows ancient insights about the possibilities of rhetoric. From antiquity, the new
rhetoric borrows an understanding of rhetoric’s methodological possibilities for creating
publicly shared reality” (Hauser and Whalen 120). On the other hand, they continue, the
common postmodern conditions of pluralism, rapid technological innovation, social
change and a surfeit of information have nearly precluded any consensus based on shared
assumptions. Rather, the postmodern rhetoric is one of shared problems or objectives.
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Instead of basing the justification for shared action on common
presuppositions about being, knowing, or doing, cooperation rests on all
parties finding their own justifications for these acceptability of these
solutions and the specific configurations they give to a common world
(Hauser and Whalen 121).
Scholars of the rhetoric of new social movements often note the pathos of the
groups’ arguments, which frequently are emotional appeals to the interests of those who
identify with the movement; at the same time, the new rhetoric acknowledges that the
audience’s interests are rhetorically constituted, a view that has roots in Cicero’s concept
of “actio,” the joint activity that takes place between the speaker and the audience. But
modern scholars have taken this idea to new levels that allow them to argue that “by
examining the rhetoric of social actors we can gain insight into how they constitute
themselves (or are constituted) as subjects and as a culture or society (Whalen and
Hauser 439).
The information age, as described by Melucci (105), allows audiences to have a
much greater role in this act of creation – so much so that on the Internet, through such
media as blogs, list serves and other opportunities for comment, it sometimes is not easy
to distinguish speaker and audience. Indeed, referring to Black’s “The Second Persona,”
Hauser and Whalen say the new rhetoric assumes that audiences are discursive
formations, and that within a new social movement all parties engage in the “articulatory
practices which constantly and undeviatingly reassert individual movement members
within the context of the movement itself.” (Whalen and Hauser 443)
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Many today argue that this need to articulate individual identity, while it is a
human quality that has been evidenced throughout the history of our species, has become
the dominant desire in modern society – often surpassing our desires for wealth, love,
community, and spirituality. If, as Touraine writes, society is drama, then rhetoric is the
dialogue of this drama, and, as with all drama, the words of the actors, their actions on
the stage, and their interactions, all are rhetorical in nature. The question, then, is whether
new social movements truly are formed by their rhetoric, and if so, how will
understanding this concept today help us understand and address today’s problems?
Case Study: The Rhetoric of the Global-Warming Counter-Claims
From the sociological and historical perspectives, it is useful to look at conservative
counter-claims against global warming policy as a social counter-movement, as McCright
and Dunlap have done in their studies (McCright and Dunlap, “Challenging Global
Warming”). This approach not only analyzes the impact of these claims on public policy,
but also recognizes the dramatic power and influence the counter-claimants have exerted
on the public, as evidenced in opinion polls, and on the news media, in the increasing
presence of counter-claim messages in print and electronic media stories on global
warming.
From a rhetorical perspective, however, a more useful approach might be to ask
whether these counter-claims appeared spontaneously as a new articulation of rhetoric in
response to the findings of global warming science, or arose from some existing group of
social actors with an established rhetorical pattern. If the former is true, then we might
have the good fortune to be witnessing the birth of a new social movement. If the latter is
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true, then we still can ask whether the source of this rhetoric is a new social movement, a
movement in the traditional sense, or not a movement at all.
The first possibility, that the conservative counter-claims against global warming
have spawned a rhetorically formed new movement, can be dismissed rather easily.
Although McCright and Dunlap found a consistency among the counter-claims of the 14
conservative think tanks that they surveyed, their research found no apparent evidence to
indicate the emergence of a “collective identity” for the speakers or the audience. One
might argue that the counter-claims have led to “social change resulting from collective
action” – a delay in decision-making and a change in public opinion – which would
satisfy Bash’s early definition of a social movement (Bash 11). One also might posit that
viewing the counter-claims as a counter-movement is merely a useful interpretation of
observable phenomena, that it could offer clues about how counter-claimants created a
common reality in the minds of the public, the media and political decision-makers.
However, as Hattam and Lowndes might say, not all changes in rhetorical content
have equal significance:
[S]ome innovations are fleeting, momentary examples of word play, while
others enact more durable shifts in meaning that reverberates through
political identifications and alliances in the most profound fashion.
Language is critical, but we too want to distinguish between flux and more
significant discursive change. (217)”
The main problem with defining global warming counter-claims as a counter-movement
arises from the absence of a collective identity that acts as an agent for the discourse. The
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three main counter-claims that McCright and Dunlap identify are not being delivered by
any group or organization that can be characterized as a movement leader or represented
as a unique identity. If, as McKeon suggests, one attempts to locate a group of “actors of
one mind in the truth” among counter-claimants in the global warming debate, then the
trail leads inexorably to the already existing conservative movement. The same change
agents are addressing a new issue in much the same way, rhetorically, that they address
all of the issues that they have chosen to debate.
McCright and Dunlap found the data for their study on websites of conservative
think tanks, and we can thank them for leading us to the right place to undertake a new
analysis of the conservative movement – an examination of rhetorical commonplaces and
ideographs that underlie the movement’s position on global warming, and an attempt to
answer the question of whether the conservative movement – widely acknowledged as an
historical movement – is actually a “new social movement” in the rhetorical sense.
By nearly every measure put forth by scholars of rhetoric, sociology and political
science, the conservative movement is a new social movement. The evidence is clear
from examining the discussions of global warming issues on the websites of conservative
think tanks, and the mission statements and other forms of information – such as “About
Us” web pages – that describe the collective identities of these organizations. Earlier, I
described one clue that enticed me to undertake such an examination that conservative
counter-claimants had been able to almost completely abandon one of their three key
arguments in the global warming debate without seeming to give up any ground they had
gained on the issue.
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A closer examination of the three arguments, including an analysis of the
associations of each argument with formative conservative principles, reveals only one of
these main arguments can be linked. This essentially left the counter-movement theory
with only one leg to stand on – but at the same time, it revealed a brilliant rhetorical
strategy. Conservatives had given themselves two fallback positions in the debate. By
dropping their first argument – that global warming science was questionable – they
could appear to be reasonable and willing to compromise. At some future date, they could
even be willing to drop their second argument – that global warming could be beneficial
instead of harmful – without harming their position.
The third argument – that governmental measures to reduce global warming will
do more harm than good – is a different story, however. Conservatives cannot abandon
this argument because it is tied to one of the formative principles of the conservative
movement – that an unfettered free market economy will always find the best solutions to
any social problem. Through an examination of global warming documents and other
environmental documents on conservative think tank websites, this study is an attempt to
identify some associations between conservative anti-environmental arguments and these
formative principles, which establish the collective identity of the movement. Before I
proceed, however, readers may benefit from some background.
The Global Warming Debate
The concept of anthropogenic global warming has been discussed in the scientific
community since not long after the turn of the 20th century, when Swedish scientist
Svante Arrhenius began studying increases in what he described as “anthropogenic
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carbon emissions.” Scientists generally agree Arrhenius was the first to speculate that
changes in the carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere could have a significant impact on
the Earth’s temperature (Arrhenius).
Some scientists began reporting evidence of global warming in the late 1930s, but
the general public, the media and governments appeared to be paying little attention to
these ideas at that time. In 1976, however, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences
undertook a review of the validity of scientific conclusions being produced by global
circulation models (GCMs) – a new research method that climate scientists were using to
predict human impacts on global temperatures. The Academy concluded that global
warming was indeed a possibility. Congress had begun to conduct hearings and the issue
began to attract media attention (Weart 126-127).
Research on climate change continued during the Reagan years, despite growing
skepticism among conservatives. Reagan’s first year in office, 1981, was reported to be
the warmest year since record-keeping began in the late 1800s (Weart 142). By 1988, a
year of record heat and droughts, media coverage of global warming spiked. Also that
year, scientific experts on global warming met in Toronto in the first attempt to develop a
broad consensus on the findings of the studies. The Toronto Conference issued a report
calling for “strict, specific limits on greenhouse gas emissions.”
Responding to public pressure, various groups of environmental scientists in 1988
formed the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, a group that was designed to
refine the consensus view of global warming. During the next two decades, the IPCC
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would lead efforts to develop proposed policy actions to stem greenhouse gas emissions,
considering both the environmental and economic impacts of such actions (Weart 158).
The IPCC’s first report, issued in 1990, was the result of two years of study and
negotiations among more than 170 scientists who were attempting to the reduce the
science to its lowest common denominator – to publish conclusions that were qualified
and cautious, with a great degree of credibility because virtually all of the points of
disagreement had been discarded. In its executive summary, the 1990 report concluded
that “emissions resulting from human activities are substantially increasing the
atmospheric concentrations of the greenhouse gases: CO2, methane, CFCs and nitrous
oxide. These increases will enhance the greenhouse effect, resulting on average in an
additional warming of the Earth's surface” (IPCC 1990).
For the next decade or so, further research tended to support the predictions,
prompting bipartisan support in Congress for measures to control global warming. In
2003, U.S. Senators John McCain (R-AZ) and Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) co-sponsored a
bill to place mandatory caps on “greenhouse gas” emissions from utilities and other
industries. The proposal was rejected, but McCain and Lieberman told the media they
were encouraged by the support from a large share of the delegation.
In August 2004, the Bush administration issued a report that the New York Times
described as a striking change in the administration’s portrayal of the science of climate
change. Citing new studies that supported the IPCC consensus, the report indicated that
“emissions of carbon dioxide and other heat-trapping gases are the only likely
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explanation for global warming over the last three decades (United States Climate
Change Science Program).”
In the December 2004 issue of Science, Naomi Oreskes, a science historian from
the University of California at San Diego, reported on her analysis of 928 scientific
abstracts on global warming that were published in referred scientific journals between
1993 and 2003. Oreskes divided these papers into six categories: [1] explicit
endorsements of the consensus position, [2] evaluation of impacts, [3] mitigation
proposals, [4] methods, [5] paleoclimate analysis, and [6] rejection of the consensus
position. Her findings:
Of all papers, 75% fell into the first three categories, either explicitly or
implicitly accepting the consensus view; 25% dealt with methods or
paleoclimate, taking no position on current anthropogenic climate change.
Remarkably, none of the papers disagreed with the consensus position
(Oreskes 1686).
According to Oreskes, the scientific community was all but unanimous in its conclusion
that anthropogenic greenhouse gases are speeding up global warming. In 2005, a group
consisting of the academies of science of 13 industrial nations – including the United
States and China – endorsed a new statement urging increased activity by developed
nations to limit greenhouse gas emissions (Joint Science Academies’ Statement).
The Emergence of the Counter-Claims
Despite the shift in its view of global warming research, the Bush administration was not
ready to embrace the Kyoto protocol or any action that would reduce fossil fuel use. In
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late 2004, the administration challenged a report compiled by 250 scientists from eight
countries who contended that the Arctic is warming almost twice as fast as the rest of the
planet due to a buildup of heat-trapping gases. Conservatives who had been worried
about Bush’s wavering on global warming breathed a sigh of relief when they realized
the President was remaining steadfast in his efforts to thwart a cap on emissions.
As early as 1990, media attention had begun to wane. Some of the more
threatening mitigation strategies – particularly those advocating reforestation and
reductions in the use of fossil fuels – had begun to worry political conservatives, who
argued that a strong economy and technology were the best ways to solve problems that
might arise from global warming. Conservative think tanks began publishing documents
promoting the notion that climate science could be wrong, and that global warming was
not a dire threat. Many in the media and general public were receptive to these ideas.
In their 2000 study, McCright and Dunlap noted that scientific consensus on
global warming had mobilized many political conservatives who were opposed to the
IPCC recommendations. They surveyed more than 275 global warming documents
posted on the websites of 14 conservative think tanks, and outlined three main arguments:
1) that the evidence of global warming is weak, if not wrong; 2) that global warming will
be beneficial if it does occur; and 3) that proposed actions to limit anthropogenic global
warming will do more harm than good.
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Table 1 • The Conservative Movement’s Counter-Claims Regarding Global Warming
(McCright/Dunlap 2003 Study)
Theme

Description

Counter-Claim One
The evidentiary basis of global warming is weak and even wrong
1 The scientific evidence for global warming is highly uncertain
2 Mainstream climate research is “junk” science
3 The IPCC intentionally altered its reports to create a “scientific consensus” on
global warming
4 Global warming is merely a myth or scare tactics produced and perpetuated by
environmentalists and bureaucrats
5 Global warming is merely a political tool of the Clinton administration
Counter-Claim Two
Global warming would be beneficial if it were to occur
1 Global warming would improve the quality of life
2 Global warming would improve our health
3 Global warming would improve our agriculture
Counter-Claim Three
Global warming policies would do more harm than good
1 Proposed action would harm the national economy
2 Proposed action would weaken national security
3 Proposed action would threaten national sovereignty
4 Proposed action would actually harm the environment

N

%

159
141
30
16

71.0
62.9
13.4
7.1

41

18.3

31

13.8

30
10
10
20

13.4
4.5
4.5
8.9

139
130
4
9
7

62.1
58.0
1.8
4.0
3.1

Used with the authors’ permission.

Compared to the challenge facing those who fear global warming will be
catastrophic, which is to convince the world’s citizens to make major changes in their
lifestyles, the challenge for dissenters is relatively easy – merely to introduce enough
doubt to convince policy makers to delay action. The conservative movement maintained
that its positions were based on the only “sound science” available. During the years
since publication of the first IPCC report, public opinion polls have indicated that the
public view may have been more influenced by the rhetoric than by the science.

31

The Public Perception
In 1989, 63 percent of the respondents to a Gallup poll indicated that they worried about
greenhouse gases or global warming a “fair amount” or “a great deal.” By 2000, after the
IPCC report was published, that number jumped to 72 percent (Gallup 1989, 2000). By
March 2004, however, after counter-claims had become common in the publications of
conservative think tanks, the figure had dropped to 51 percent.
In March 2009, another Gallup survey indicated that an increasing number of
Americans were expressing doubt about global warming science. “Although a majority of
Americans believe the seriousness of global warming is either correctly portrayed in the
news or underestimated, a record-high 41 percent now say it is exaggerated. This
represents the highest level of public skepticism about mainstream reporting on global
warming seen in more than a decade of Gallup polling on the subject,” the Gallup report
stated. (Gallup 2009)
Throughout the history of Gallup polling on the subject, global warming has
never ranked higher than eighth in the 10 environmental problems listed. In a survey by
the Pew Research Center released in January 2009, Americans ranked global warming
20th on a list of 20 issues. The issue had dropped from 15th place two years earlier (Pew).
During the past three-to-four years, changing public opinion on global warming
has been touted extensively on the web pages of U.S. conservative think tanks, which say
Americans are realizing that high potential costs of measures to combat global warming
might outweigh their uncertain benefits. At the same time, scientists are alarmed at the
apathy, seeing the resulting delays as a threat to the progress they have made on the issue.
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The Conservative Movement as a New Social Movement
Clearly there is a powerful force controlling anti-environmental rhetoric: the conservative
movement itself. But is the conservative movement a new social movement? Based on an
analysis of the information found on conservative think tank websites today, and an
assessment based on the prevailing theories of “new rhetoric” and “new social
movements,” the answer is “Yes.”
Studies of social movements in the United States have identified a number of
issue-specific conservative movements that have appeared since the 1970s – including
the pro-family movement, the militia movement, the anti-immigration movement, and the
pro-life movement. A large share of these studies has focused on how these movements
have arisen in response to perceived threats to conservative interests and values. These
single-issue movements fit the traditional model of social movements that has dominated
European theory throughout recent history – they involve a particular threat, a response, a
call to action, and consequences.
Few studies have dealt with the rhetoric of these movements. A 2006 study by
three sociologists – Shoon Lio, Scott Melzer and Ellen Reese – focused almost
exclusively on rhetoric by examining the framing strategies of the gun rights movement
and the English-only movement. They found several key threads in these movements that
involved the active construction of threats to the “status, identities, and values of white
Americans.”
Conservative and right-wing groups actively construct the past in ways
that lament the impending or actual loss of what they believe to be
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fundamental American values. These politically right groups frame
cultural change as the loss of individual responsibility and freedom,
constructing immigrants, gun-control proponents, and others associated
with liberal politics as advocates for greater dependence on the federal
government. (12)
Lio et al list attributes that they consider important to conservative social movements –
such as the notion of a model citizen who has succeeded through hard work, selfdiscipline and traditional values –which are expressed in the discourse of the movements.
Often, conservative movement rhetors use narratives to construct realities that ring true
for their members. A common example is the story of the American citizen who has been
denied employment either due to competition from an illegal immigrant, or because of an
affirmative action hiring decision (Lio, Melzer and Reese 6-7).
In conservative writings about environmental issues, including global warming, a
common narrative is the cautionary tale of the small business person who is denied an
opportunity to operate in a free market because fuel prices have been artificially elevated
by increased taxes, government restraints on production, and emission controls. A nearly
universal theme in arguments against limits on greenhouse gases, the principal strategy
thus far proposed to limit anthropogenic climate change, is that the policy will give unfair
advantages to America’s competitors in global markets – another blow to free markets.
A few scholars in political science have looked at conservatives as a single
unified movement. One of the three case studies in the Hattam and Lowndes 2007 article,
“The Ground Beneath Our Feet: Language, Culture, and Political Change,” traces the
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history of the conservative movement back to the Dixiecrat Revolt of 1948, when
right-wing activist Charles Wallace Collins attempted to create a new political party from
a coalition of white, racist Democrats in the South and conservative Republicans from the
North. The effort failed to meet its original goal of creating a States’ Rights party, but
Hattam and Lowndes argue that Collins’ relentless rhetoric – consisting mainly of a
plethora of essays and articles – creating a movement that persisted and finally “bore
institutional fruit” in 1980 with the election of Ronald Reagan. (205-210)
A 1997 book by Jean Stefancic and Richard Delgado, No Mercy: How
Conservative Think Tanks and Foundations Changed America’s Social Agenda, is the
first to recognize the community of conservative think tanks as a principal rhetor in the
conservative movement, and perhaps as the most powerful agent of change. They date the
emergence of these organizations to the 1960s, when conservative national politicians
began raising funds for research to support their positions. Richard Nixon’s election in
1968, when moderate conservatism became fashionable, was a further boost to the
conservative movement (3).
Stefancic and Delgado write of a lull in conservative activity until 1978, when a
new book titled, A Time for Truth, by William Simon, treasury secretary under
Presidents Nixon and Ford, “called for a radical rethinking of conservative principles”
and led to a dramatic shift toward radical conservatism. By the mid-1980s, the new
conservative movement exploded, embracing such issues as official English, immigration
reform, welfare revisions, affirmative action, and women’s procreative rights. By the
1990s, conservatives were on the verge of holding majorities in both houses of Congress
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for the first time in 40 years, and House Speaker Newt Gingrich was promoting his
“Contract with America,” which proposed to limit government interference in
American’s lives, as a pledge to implement conservative policies at all levels of the
federal government (4).
Stefancic and Delgado give great weight to the rhetoric produced by the think
tanks during this period of United States history. Their list of factors contributing to the
success of the conservative think tanks over their liberal and neutral counterparts includes
better narratives, a greater focus on a small number of issues, the ability to pick issues
that resonate with their community, and the ability to move easily from one issue to
another merely by applying the same principles to each new issue. (141-146)
Not only do conservatives have more money to spend […] the nature of
their rhetoric, slogans, metaphors, heroes, myths, rallying cries, and
stirring causes is more calculated to rally support among the uncommitted
than those the liberals have to offer. (Stefancic and Delgado 147-148)
Conservative think tanks also have been successful in generating terms that the media
find attractive, write Stefancic and Delgado, whose list includes “political correctness,”
“reverse discrimination,” “innocent white male,” and “immigrant horde” (151).
In their arguments against global warming theory, conservative think tank
analysts added to that list the terms, “junk science” and “illegal trade restrictions,” which
they apply broadly to the scientific and policy documents their opponents were using to
argue in favor of mandated limits on greenhouse gas emissions. By implication, illegal
trade restrictions are associated with two other terms – “free market economy” and
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“limited government” – that have long been part of the conservative vocabulary. These
terms appear almost without exception in prominent locations on the 14 conservative
think tank websites surveyed by this writer.
Although Stefancic and Delgado do not employ the terminology of rhetorical
studies in their work, their isolation of numerous short phrases as key elements of
conservative successes fits rather neatly into Michael McGee’s model of the rhetorical
“ideograph,” which he defines as a “high-order abstraction representing collective
commitment to a particular but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal (“The
Ideograph” 436).”
Because ideographs are ordinary-language terms – such as “liberty,” “freedom of
speech,” “property,” “rule of law,” and “right of privacy” – adherents of new social
movements like the conservative movement are conditioned to believe the words have
obvious meanings, and thus they can accept the actions recommended by movement
spokespeople based on allegiance to their personal interpretations of these meanings.
Each ideograph, McGee writes, has a separate diachronic meaning that is subject to
argument, but together, a set of ideographs can provide a collective meaning for the
group. For the movement, this latter, synchronic meaning can warrant the use of power
for political means, and can excuse group behavior that might be considered eccentric or
antisocial if undertaken by an individual (“The Ideograph” 436).
The research by Stefancic and Delgado clearly places conservative think tanks in
a position to be viewed as representatives of the new social movement of conservatism
when it stresses the importance of instilling a sense of community among followers and
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potential followers. Their emphasis on narrative rather than statistics in conservative
“white papers” is emotive and rhetorically effective in creating and maintaining the social
identity of the movement. The ideological nature of conservative programs, the threat
narrative that “is calculated to manipulate fear and insecurity” among followers, and their
refusal to compromise their principles, are all designed to remind people of the larger
conservative agenda (148).
Even a cursory perusal of the mission statements, “About Us” web pages and
other self-descriptive writings on the think tank websites provide ample evidence to
support the “new social movement” definition. The focus on narrative enables the think
tanks to construct a vision of the conservative “code hero” who represents the shared
values and interests that Hauser and Whalen consider essential for new social
movements. (Hauser and Whalen 121) Think tank self-descriptions represent the
“identity construction” that is inherent in all new social movement framing activities.
(Hunt, Benford and Snow 123), and the act of making such statements would satisfy
Melucci, who writes that “action by new social movements may consist of nothing more
than the production of a cultural code (171).”
The “About Us” description on the website of the Heartland Institute offers a
good example of how ideographs permeate the conservative rhetoric (italics added):
Heartland’s mission is to discover, develop, and promote free market
solutions to social and economic problems. Such solutions include
parental choice in education, choice and personal responsibility in health
care, market-based approaches to environmental protection, privatization
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of public services, and deregulation in areas where property rights and
markets do a better job than government bureaucracies.
By establishing these terms and associated commonplaces as principles of the
organization, Heartland has the potential to gain the support of any individual
who accepts a positive personal definition of one or more of these ideographs, and
then may state a position or take action based on collective definitions of the
terms (McGee “The Ideograph” 435).
The wide use of ideographs places the conservative movement squarely in
the realm of new social movements because they represent the rhetorically
constituted interests that Hauser and Whalen establish as a prerequisite for
applying the term (Hauser and Whalen 121). The cooperation that is required for a
new social movement not only to exist, but also to be successful, rests on each
party finding its own justification for the action of the collective, and the abstract
nature of the movement’s ideographs enables a wide variety of interpretation.
Thus, an individual who identifies with the conservative movement’s
principle that free market solutions are always better than government
intervention, can potentially accept any argument on the issue of global warming
that appears to embrace this view. And that precisely describes the third main
counter-claim against global warming theory that McCright and Dunlap identified
in their study – that even if global warming is real, and even if warming is not
beneficial, then the proposed government-mandated solutions will do more harm
than good because of their negative impacts on the free market economy.
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In their study, McCright and Dunlap subdivided this third counter-claim
into four sub-groups (See Exhibit 1). Not only did the conservative thinks tanks
argue that proposed global warming policy would be harmful, they argued that the
policy would harm 1) national economy; 2) national security; 3) national
sovereignty; and 4) the environment. However, potential harm to the national
economy was by far the most dominant concern. Of 139 documents reviewed, 130
focused on the economy (McCright and Dunlap, “Challenging Global Warming”
510).
Reading the Conservative Movement’s Rhetoric on Global Warming
This thesis examines a selection of the rhetoric of the American conservative movement,
a new social movement that has exercised an increasing level of political power on a
variety of important issues since the end of World War II. The point of departure for this
effort is the McCright/Dunlap study, which examined movement’s counter-claims
regarding global warming during an eight-year period from 1990 to 1997 and described
three main arguments to delay proposed policy actions to prevent or minimize climate
change through reduction of carbon emissions.
Noting some changes in the nature of those arguments since the McCright and
Dunlap study, this researcher examined 114 more recent documents circulated by the
same 14 conservative think tanks – with one exception. The group, Citizens for a Sound
Economy, surveyed by McCright-Dunlap in 2000, split into two groups in 2004. This
study includes one of those two groups, Freedom Works, which has tended to focus on
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the issues being debated in global warming; whereas, the other splinter group, the
Freedom Works Foundation, has focused more on conservative fundraising efforts.
This study utilizes documents found through an Internet search on the official
website for each think tank surveyed. This researcher conducted searches of their Internet
sites using the keywords “global warming” to identify potential documents for the
survey. In all, the searches found 5,593 unique documents containing these keywords. I
also reviewed the web pages containing the “collective identity statements” of each think
tank, to identify rhetorical artifacts that contained ideographs and other language
constructs that were common to a majority of the think tanks.
Many of the global warming documents mentioned this subject only in the course
of discussion of other primary subjects, or in lists summarizing the principal issues the
organizations had chosen to pursue. Many of the documents listed on the websites were
not authored by analysts from the organization, but rather by analysts from other
organizations, by journalists, and by blog commenters, resulting in much duplication.
Many of the documents, although they addressed the subject of global warming as their
central points of discussion, were quite old. It appears that some of the think tanks keep
all of their documents posted in their current online libraries, while others eliminate all
but the most recent publications.
To narrow the sample to a manageable level, this researcher then undertook a
process that
•

eliminated all documents that addressed global warming only as a secondary
subject in its discussion;
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•

eliminated all documents authored outside the organization, because the
researcher’s purpose was to portray the position of each organization on global
warming policy; and

•

eliminated all documents published before 1997, because one purpose was to
identify changes that occurred after the McCright/Dunlap study.
After those documents were eliminated, the researcher chose to sample the

remaining documents based on their currency, reasoning that the most recent documents
posted would most accurately reflect the organization’s current position on global
warming, and would be the most likely to reveal any recent changes in the organization’s
position. This researcher chose in each case to examine the 10 documents most recently
published by each think tank on the subject of global warming. If fewer than 10
documents were posted by a single organization, then the researcher used all of the
available documents for that website. This narrowed the field to 114 documents.
In the second part of the study, this researcher reviewed the “collective identity
statements” to identify discursive links between these statements and the organization’s
global warming arguments.
Methodology and Tabulated Results
This survey coded the global warming documents into three main categories: 1) those
that acknowledged the existence of global warming; 2) those that posited the existence of
global warming in order to debate the merits of proposed policies to reduce global
warming; and 3) those that either directly or implicitly denied the existence of global
warming. Documents that fell into the first two categories were considered to be in
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disagreement with the McCright/Dunlap study’s Counter-Claim One, which characterizes
the evidence of global warming as either weak or wrong.
Changes in the Conservative Arguments
Research of the current views on global warming of 14 conservative think tanks revealed
an evident contrast to the findings of McCright and Dunlap, who studied the same 14
organizations. In McCright/Dunlap, counter-claim one – that the evidentiary basis of
global warming is weak and even wrong – is by far the most common argument of the
conservative analysts. More than 70 percents of the documents they reviewed expressed
either a firm belief that the predictions of warming were wrong, or expressed doubt that
the predictions were reliable. By the late 2000s, however, this argument had nearly
disappeared. In the survey for this paper, 86 percent of the documents reviewed either
openly acknowledged the existence of global warming, or presented arguments based on
an assumption that warming has occurred.
Table 2: The Conservative Movement’s Current Position:
Is Global Warming is Actually Occurring? (2009)
Number of conservative think tanks surveyed: 14
Total number of documents analyzed: 100

Number of
documents

% of total
analyzed

Openly acknowledge that global warming is occurring

52

52%

Conditionally express a belief in global warming

34

34%

Either openly acknowledge that global warming is
occurring or conditionally express a belief in global
warming

86

86%
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Typically, the conservative argument today is that the answer to the problem of global
warming lies in allowing the free market to find solutions such as adaptation to climate
changes, bioengineering to eliminate or sequester excess carbon dioxide, and finding
cleaner ways to burn our remaining fossil fuels – anything but mandatory limits on
greenhouse gas emissions. These arguments often begin with acknowledgement of the
phenomenon of global warming, as in a statement issued in June 2009 by the National
Center for Policy Analysis (NCPA):
Global warming is a reality. But whether it is a serious problem – and
whether emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases
from human fossil fuel use are the principal cause – is uncertain. The
current debate over the U. S. response to climate change centers on
greenhouse gas emissions reduction policies, which are likely to impose
substantially higher costs to society than global warming might.
This statement contrasts sharply with the statement on global warming that NCPA issued
more than a decade earlier, in a May 1997 report:
While ground-level temperature measurements suggest the earth has
warmed between 0.3 and 0.6 degrees Celsius since 1850, global satellite
data, the most reliable of climate measurements, show no evidence of
warming during the past 18 years.
Unfortunately, many of these conservative think tanks have removed earlier documents
that were posted on their websites, so an extensive before-and-after contrast of their
statements is impossible. However, an examination of their current documents is enough
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to show a trend away from their earlier denials of anthropogenic global warming. This
change is significant not because conservative think tanks have changed their positions
opposing government action (they have not), but rather because it reveals a clue to
persuasive strategy of the arguments.
The first two of the three counter-claims identified by McCright and Dunlap are
expendable. The first argument, that global warming may not even exist, already has been
largely abandoned by the think tanks without any noticeable weakening of their position.
The second argument, that global warming might be beneficial, also could be dropped
with no ill effects. Neither of the two have any connection to the steadfast, underlying
conservative principle that is behind the conservative position, which is, that no
government policy should be allowed to limit the ability of the free market economy to
operate without constraint. The third argument, that government regulation of greenhouse
gas emissions could do more harm than good, is tied directly to the movement’s free
market principle and can never be abandoned. That would be blasphemy.
By conceding that global warming might actually be occurring, the conservative
movement is practicing the rhetoric of science, which allows the introduction of new data
to alter the argument. The think tanks make new statements that appear to have been
derived through an application of dialectic principles to reach logical conclusions. By
incorporating these conciliatory “gestures” into their discourse, they lend credence to
their remaining arguments – they seem to be reasonable people whether they are or not.
The beauty of this approach is that when future issues arise that are as complex as
global warming, instead of having to systematically refute the science, or logic, of their
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opponents, conservatives merely must cast the issue in terms of its threat to the
identifying codes of their movement: Proposals to limit global warming are a threat to
free enterprise by putting us at a disadvantage in global trade competition. Proposals to
limit global warming are a way that liberals can impose more government control on our
lives. Proposals to limit global warming are a way to limit the high standard of living that
we have worked so hard to achieve. Proposals to limit global warming are a threat to our
way of life, and we must band together to eliminate this threat.
The Collective Identity of the Conservative “New Social Movement”
In their introductory essay to the 1994 book, New Social Movements: From Ideology to
Identity, Hank Johnson, Enrique Laraňa and Joseph R. Gusfield offer a description of the
role of identities that probably should be in the official handbook for new social
movements:
Though [new social movements] may have no clear class or structural
base, the movement becomes the focus for the individual’s definition of
himself and herself, and action within the movement is a complex mix of
the collective and individual confirmations of identity. (8)
Similarly, Hauser and Whalen posit that “new social movement rhetoric centers on the
problem of the loss of identity and the need for engagement in the redemptive discourses
of self-discovery (Whalen and Hauser 443),” and “by examining the rhetoric of social
actors [with a new social movement], we can gain insight into how they constitute
themselves (or are constituted) as subjects and as a culture or society. (Whalen and
Hauser 439)”
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Thus, the bottom line is that within new social movements, the success of the
movement depends largely on the success of its articulation of itself, that the primary aim
of the movement rhetoric may not be to persuade someone to take a certain position on a
certain issue, but rather to create an environment in which the participant feels
comfortable, and is amenable to, the positions on issues that the movement takes now and
in the future. A person who accepts the collective identity of a “vegan” will be receptive
to the position of vegans on certain issues, and a person who considers himself or herself
a “conservative” will be amenable to the conservative position on global warming.
Based on the prevailing theories of new social movements, then, each movement
will have a common set of principles, beliefs or commonplaces that establish the
collective identity of the movement, so that when a person calls himself or herself a
“vegan,” for example, then there will be others who know almost instinctively that they
share that “vegan” identity, because they are aware of the commonly shared attributes of
veganism – the “collective and individual confirmations” of vegan identity.
This researcher’s survey of 14 conservative think tanks reveals consistent
requirements for conservative movement “membership,” which can be described by
extracting attributes from the “collective identity” documents on the think tank websites.
Based on that survey, the common principles, or “commonplaces,” of the conservative
movement are
•

individual freedom

•

unfettered operation of the free market economy

•

minimal governmental interference in personal lives and business
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•

the sanctity of private property

•

national security

•

the American way of life (material prosperity)

When the subject of global warming is isolated, the list of commonplaces used in
arguments against proposed global warming policy action is narrowed to:
•

unfettered operation of the free market economy

•

minimal governmental interference in personal lives and business

•

national security

The single ideograph most associated with these commonplaces is the term, “free market
economy.” The commonplace, “unfettered operation of the free market economy,” by
definition, implies minimal government interference, and because national security is
generally tied in part to the ability to trade freely in global markets, then the national
security commonplace is inextricably bound to the free market ideograph.
Consequently, the analysis is dramatically simplified. The most successful
arguments against government-mandated solutions for the problem of global warming
will be based on the free market ideograph that is a fundamental component of the
conservative movement – which is a new social movement that has rhetorically
constructed the interests of its adherents. A review of the conservative movement’s
global warming arguments presented on the websites of 14 conservative think tanks
reveals that most of those either explicitly mention or imply an association with the
principles of free markets. Conservative think tanks are opposed to government control of
greenhouse gas emissions. Their position on this issue is virtually the same position they
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have on all environmental issues. They are generally opposed to mandated solutions,
because, by definition, government solutions restrict free trade.
Below are excerpts from the global warming documents posted by 13 of the 14
conservative think tanks surveyed. In each example, this author has italicized words that
are either conservative movement ideographs, or commonplace words and phrases
associated with a conservative ideograph. The list does not include excerpts from any
document or documents from the National Center for Public Policy Research. This
organization regularly publishes a blog on the subject, but the blog contents appear to be
exclusively critiques designed to ridicule opponents in the debate. There are no clear
statements of the organization’s positions on the issue.
Example 1: In September 2007 testimony before the Senate Committee on Environment
and Public Works, the American Enterprise Institute’s Kenneth Green made it clear
how his organization views proposed greenhouse gas controls:
Now, to the question of the day: do global warming initiatives “create”
“new green” jobs? The short answer, I would say, is that they might do so,
but only at the expense of other jobs that would otherwise have been
produced by the free market. Further, I'd suggest that the end result would
be significantly less jobs on net, less overall economic growth on net, and
most likely, the loss of existing capital as a by-product.
Example 2: The Foundation for Research on Economics & the Environment (FREE)
describes its mission as working “with opinion leaders and decision makers to
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demonstrate how science and economics can effectively deal with contentious policy
issues in ways consistent with a society of free and responsible individuals and America's
founding ideals.” In a paper on global warming, FREE states that current economic
hardship has revealed a solution to global warming:
The economic crisis has accomplished something that many nations have
been trying, and failing, to do for years – reduce CO2 emissions. This
reality highlights the enormous social and technical challenges we face. Is
a continuing recession and reduction in prosperity the best way to deal
with climate change or any environmental problem? No. Economic growth
and the investment it fosters is the only sure path to a cleaner, safer
environment.
Example 3: The Heritage Foundation’s position on global warming combines concern
for economic impacts of proposed greenhouse gas reductions with its concern for national
security. In a document discussing the pros and cons of cap-and-trade legislation:
[I]f the Senate really wants to get serious about how global warming
affects national security, it should closely examine the rules and
regulations under Waxman-Markey and similar government-driven
efforts. These rules would stifle economic growth, create energy scarcity,
and make fragile states even more fragile. For example, a collapse in U.S.
economic growth would result in even more draconian cuts to the defense
budget, leaving America with a military much less prepared to deal with
future threats. … Likewise, a steep drop in American economic growth
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would lengthen and deepen the global recession. That in turn will make
other states poorer, undermining their ability to protect themselves and
recover from natural disasters.
Example 4: The Reason Institute’s position on global warming policy makes explicit
reference to free market economics and two other conservative commonplaces:
Regardless of whether climate change eventually turns out to be real or
not, the libertarian goal ought to be to ensure the protection and
advancement of freedom – and all its attendant institutions: free markets,
limited government and property rights.
Example 5: In a document posted on November 8, 2007, Claremont Institute analysts
George A. Pieler and Jens F. Laurson summarize their organization’s position on global
warming policy. In this excerpt, they advocate transferring of responsibility for action on
global warming from the political arena to a system based on human ingenuity:
Along with recovering the honesty and humility that is essential to
science, we need confidence in civilization – enough to know that if
warming starts occurring at a precipitous rate, we can deal with it and
adapt. Rather than subordinating economic freedom to a state-run War on
Carbon, maximizing human wealth will equip us to manage if that crisis
occurs. In the meantime, we might be better advised to engage in a serious
debate rather than return scientific inquiry to the Dark Ages.
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Example 6: This policy statement comes from Freedom Works, the think tank founded
in 1984 by conservative U.S. Senator Dick Armey:
Just because global warming is happening and we’re responsible for it
doesn’t mean that the economic benefits of responding to it outweigh the
economic costs. Dealing with costs is something that few global-warming
policy advocates on the left seem to want to do, despite the fact that it’s
the only sensible way to figure out what program, if any, might be
necessary to respond to climate change. If energy costs are going to go up
for Americans, shouldn’t there be significant environmental benefit and
progress towards reversing climate change?
Example 7: This statement from the Cato Institute was used earlier, but bears repeating
here because it contains clear reference to the free-market ideograph:
To the extent that global warming is a real problem warranting action, it
needs to be addressed globally rather than through unilateral efforts.
Antagonizing trade partners through probably illegal trade measures will
undermine efforts to secure global cooperation on climate change. A freer,
more prosperous economy is a more auspicious path to ensuring a more
rapid spread of environmental technology and the global consensus
needed to combat climate change.
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Example 8: The National Center for Policy Research acknowledges global warming as
a problem, but advocates adaption and economic solutions rather than reduction of
greenhouse gases from anthropogenic sources:
Most laws and treaties proposed to prevent, reduce or slow global
warming would be expensive and do little to prevent warming or future
harms. For a fraction of the costs, we could prevent much more harm and
benefit many more people by adapting to a warmer world.
Example 9: In his opening remarks to the Third International Conference on Climate
Change in June 2009, Heartland Institute President Joseph Bast summarized his
organization’s views, by stating, in part:
That’s why all you hear and read about is global warming alarmism. It’s
why you never hear from the tens of thousands of scientists who don’t think
global warming is a crisis, or the economists who say cap and trade will
ruin the country’s economy. It’s why Congress is debating new laws and
taxes that would cost hundreds of billions of dollars a year and not affect the
climate one wit.
Example 10: Likewise, the Competitive Enterprise Institute opposes energy-usage
limitations to reduce greenhouse gases because the organization anticipates significant
impacts on business operations:
Global warming is happening, and humans are responsible for at least
some of it. Yet this fact does not mean that global warming will cause
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enough damage to Earth and to humanity to require drastic cuts in energy
use, a policy that would have damaging consequences of its own.
Example 11: The Hoover Institution’s rhetoric focuses on the flaws and costs of
cap-and-trade legislation, arguing that the approach would create huge economic
imbalances that could upset the global marketplace:
The greenhouse gas problem is more broadly recognized today than it was
during the Kyoto Protocol negotiations a decade ago. Moreover, the
protocol, which was meant to stabilize greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere, is fatally flawed. The emissions that cause climate change can
originate anywhere, so the precondition of success is universal coverage.
Yet the emission limits proposed by the protocol imposed too high an
economic price on some countries and too low a price on others. The
carbon cap-and-trade system that was laid out under the protocol would
create gigantic property rights in some areas and daunting deficits in
others, implying a huge transfer of funds among countries.
Example 12: In a 2007 document titled “Hysteria’s History: Environmental Alarmism in
Context,” Pacific Research Institute analysts Amy Kaleita and Gregory R. Forbes argue
that government solutions to global warming problems actually preclude the possibility
of solutions from the private sector:
[A]larmist responses to valid problems risk foreclosing potentially useful
responses based on ingenuity and progress. There are many examples
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from the energy sector where, in the presence of economic, efficiency, or
societal demands, the marketplace has responded by developing better
alternatives. That is not to say that we should blissfully squander our
energy resources; on the contrary, we should be careful to utilize them
wisely. But energy-resource hysteria should not lead us to circumvent
scientific advancement by … favoring one particular replacement
technology at the expense of other promising technologies.
Example 13: Of the 14 conservative think tanks surveyed, only the Marshall Institute
seems to have been faithful to a disciplined analytical approach. The institute’s
documents are shorn of rhetorical devices compared to documents on other sites. Most of
Marshall’s work consists of statistical studies and summaries of the findings of economic
theorists. In one study of the potential economic impacts of cap-and-trade, Marshall
analysts predict:
Despite the differences in estimates, our analysis strongly indicates the
abatement costs could cause around a 0.8%-1% of drop in consumption
below the business-as-usual scenario. This is a conservative estimate;
many studies project that costs are likely to be even higher. Given these
estimates, we can conclude that the costs of mitigation are likely to be
huge.
(Note: As noted above on page 51, no data is included for the National Center for Public
Policy Research. The NCPRR’s only content on global warming is entries on a blog that
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exclusively consists of critiques designed to ridicule opponents in the debate, with no
clear NCPRR position statements.)
Perspectives for the Future
Even without new social movement theory as a unifying concept to guide an examination
of rhetoric on the issue of global warming, the conservative movement’s language clearly
reflects a unified collective view of the subject and a unified position. Based on my
sample of more than a hundred documents, conservative think tanks – which are the most
apparent voices of the conservative ideology ostensibly independent of party affiliations
– are speaking together. The principle of free enterprise, expressed in a variety of ways, is
the steadfastly underlying element of all conservative arguments against government
action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Arguments about the validity of climate
science, and arguments about the potential to adapt to, and perhaps even benefit from,
climate change come and go, but free market proponents never falter in their contention
that the best approach to environmental problems is to sit back and allow market forces to
prevail. This is because a belief in free market solutions is part of the collective identity
of the movement.
In his 1991 book, The Rhetoric of Reaction, which addressed efforts to prevent or
delay public policy and government solutions to social problems, economist Albert
Hirschman notes that such efforts are successful because they stress the jeopardy of
taking action, (we risk losing achievements already gained), the futility of the effort (any
action is a waste of time and resources), and the perverse effects that could result (our
actions will only make matters worse) (7).
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And persistence is virtue when a social actor advocates doing nothing. In a
January 2009 posting on Yale University’s blog, Environment 360 (e360.yale.edu), Ted
Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger, of the “progressive” Breakthrough Institute, argue
that Americans are suffering from “apocalypse fatigue” because of dire predictions from
some climate scientists, resulting in a declining public belief in global warming:
Having been told that climate science demands that we fundamentally
change our way of life, many Americans have, not surprisingly, concluded
that the problem is not with their lifestyles but with what they’ve been told
about the science. And in this they are not entirely wrong, insofar as some
prominent climate advocates, in their zeal to promote action, have made
representations about the state of climate science that go well beyond any
established scientific consensus on the subject.
Unfortunately, when opponents in a debate fail to share a common objective, then the
result usually is stalemate and inaction. This appears to be the case with global warming.
Yet, one can hope that the current state is only a necessary part of the process; that closer
examination and analysis of the motivations, beliefs and desires of the various parties will
eventually reveal a common ground on which to resume the search for answers.
Viewing the global warming debate from a rhetorical perspective – especially on
the basis of new social movement theory, which seems to be an especially pertinent
approach in today’s arena of identity politics – may be fruitful. Representing one extreme
in the debate, the counter-claims of the conservative movement appear to be based on a
collective identity that defines conservatism as a new social movement, and by applying
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the principles of new movement theory, we can identify key elements of the conservative
identity. Likewise, applying the same approach to other players in the global warming
debate might reveal key elements of other identities; and, if there are common elements
among those identities, then there may be room for action based on compromise.
Arguments on both sides of the global warming issue are rhetorical in the classic
sense too, in that they are designed to persuade others, as well as to create identity and
meaning for those who are already inclined to believe. In Rhetoric, Aristotle views
arguments as “responsible public discourse,” which implies that in attempting to
persuade, the speaker must have a responsibility to promote better understanding of a
subject, not merely to achieve his or her rhetorical goals.
In a 1970 article in response to the Wingspread Conference, Wayne Booth warns
fellow rhetoricians that concentrating too much on creating rhetoric for those who already
believe, a group he calls “the community of the blessed,” turns the rhetorical act into a
futile endeavor. Booth writes, “[t]he temptation is to a self-satisfied exposé of the
opponent’s fallacies and absurdities, without making the slightest effort to move into his
circle of assumptions and argue from there. (“Scope of Rhetoric Today” 87).” Such an
approach does nothing to improve understanding, but instead destroys “the public” (and
hence, the public good) as a collective, and builds “a variety of hostile publics, more or
less sealed off from each other (“Scope of Rhetoric Today” 99), accomplishing nothing.
More than 30 years later, not long before his death in 2005, Booth essentially took
a moral stand on rhetoric. Despite their desire to restore the reputation of their discipline,
which had suffered for centuries from its association with deception, Booth argued that
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rhetoricians must accept the fact that “rhetoric” still is an art not only of “removing
misunderstanding,” but also of “producing misunderstanding.” Once one is willing to
acknowledge the dark side, then the door is open to consider the speaker’s ethical
responsibilities to his or her audience.
It is ethically wrong to pursue or rely on or deliberately produce
misunderstanding, while it is right to pursue understanding. To pursue
deception creates non-communities in which winner takes all. To pursue
mutual understanding creates communities in which everyone needs and
deserves attention. (Booth “Rhetoric of Rhetoric” 40)
Booth writes that once opponents in a controversy are willing to pursue understanding,
they can listen to each other and find common ground behind the conflict. And as
rhetoricians, our study of rhetorical issues is “our best resource for distinguishing the
good making from the bad (“Rhetoric of Rhetoric” 16).”
Booth’s faith in the purifying process of rhetoric and rhetorical studies is shared
to some extent by another rhetorician, Celeste Michelle Condit, who wrote in 1987 that
“public rhetoric can … be viewed as a process in which basic human desires are
transformed into shared moral codes (2).” Ideographs, Condit contends, are indications of
shared commitments to a moral code, and when an ideograph is widely shared (perhaps
across political lines), it may become a mechanism that gives various parties to “take the
perspective of the other,” which is a basic requisite of morality (310). And once morality
is defined outside the collective, it is harder to change.
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Although the collectivity always retains power to modify the (moral) code,
it cannot exert unlimited control. As long as the discourse process is
relatively open, the nature of the code itself, as well as the broad
biological, psychological, and social limitations upon human beings,
exerts an important external moral force (Condit 311).
Booth and Condit are optimistic and idealistic. But their views on the importance and
power of ethical and moral considerations in public discourse have a practical
application. This researcher’s examination of conservative arguments on the global
warming issues also revealed a plethora of logical fallacies in those arguments. In the 114
conservative think-tank documents reviewed, there were 186 flaws in logic – ranging
from ad hominem attacks on global warming scientists to slippery slope scenarios of dire
consequences of adopting the proposed government mandates to limit greenhouses gases.
This assessment was based on widely accepted criteria developed by Howard Kahane
(Kahane), and Michael LaBossiere (LaBossiere).
This author’s purpose in reviewing the “bad rhetoric” in conservative documents
is not to engender the hostility that Booth believed “does nothing to improve
understanding,” but rather to search for some of the flaws that might one day be
abandoned by the principal participants in the global warming debate, for there are, no
doubt, flaws on either side.
Global warming is not only an issue for debate; it is a phenomenon for which
there is considerable scientific evidence, an empirical element of our lives that exists
independently of the rhetoric, the politics, the collectives, and the opinions of those who
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are participating in the war of language that has broken out around the issue. If the world
heats up, cools down, or stays the same, it will do so regardless of what we think. At best,
human influence may or may not affect the outcome, so that we are left with a choice: Do
we face this problem with an attitude of despair, or with an attitude of hope?
This writer chooses the latter. It is my hope that research such as this will help
lead us to a shared commitment, or a generally accepted principle, that we should
undertake no action to endanger the future, nor delay any action that will improve our lot.
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Appendix A – Survey Form
Name of Think Tank:
Evidence of a change in arguments
Number of documents accessed with keywords “global warming”
Total number of documents analyzed
Number of documents that acknowledge global warming as a fact
Number of documents that state a *conditional1 belief in global warming
Date range of documents (by years)
*A “conditional” belief in global warming is one that 1) acknowledges global warming as plausible; 2) is
willing to accept global warming as real for the sake of argument (Ex.“Even if global warming is
happening, it could be beneficial.”); or 3) tacitly acknowledges the phenomenon of global warming as an
element of the argument.
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Appendix B: List of Documents Analyzed, with URLs
Total Number Analyzed:
114
American Enterprise Institute – www.aei.org
www.aei.org/about
www.aei.org/issue/100016 (12-09-09)
www.aei.org/issue/28202 (06-27-08)
www.aei.org/issue/25661 (02-22-07)
www.aei.org/issue/12922 (06-01-01)
The Cato Institute – www.cato.org
www.cato.org/about.php
www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11061
www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10638
www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10940
www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10520
www.cato.org/testimony/ct-pm-20090212.html
www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9875
www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9831
www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9646
www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9562
Claremont Institute – www.claremont.org
www.claremont.org/about/
www.claremont.org/publications/pubid.740/pub_detail.asp
Competitive Enterprise Institute – cei.org
cei.org/about
cei.org/cei_files/fm/active/0/Comment%20on%20Tailoring%20Rule%20Marlo%20Lewi
s%20Competitive%20Enterprise%20Institute%20Final.pdf (12-30-09)
cei.org/cei_files/fm/active/1/StatementofMarloLewis.pdf (10-28-09)
cei.org/cei_files/fm/active/0/Daniel%20Sutter%20%20Hurricane%20Damage%20and%20Global%20Warming.pdf (06-03-09)
cei.org/node/20961 (07-17-08)
cei.org/cei_files/fm/active/0/EnvironmentalSource_Warming.pdf (07-17-08)
cei.org/cei_files/fm/active/0/Iain%20Murray%20%20Economic%20Response%20to%20Global%20Warming%20%20FINAL_WEB.pdf (06-19-08)
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cei.org/cletters/2008/04/16/joint-letter-president-bush-climate-policy (04-16-08)
cei.org/pdf/5430.pdf (07-13-06)
ff.org/centers/csspp/pdf/skepticguide.pdf (08-2006)
cei.org/pdf/4602.pdf (06-14-05)
Foundation for Research on Economics & the Environment – www.free-eco.org
www.free-eco.org/about.php
www.free-eco.org/articleDisplay.php?id=693
www.free-eco.org/articleDisplay.php?id=676
www.free-eco.org/articleDisplay.php?id=657
www.free-eco.org/articleDisplay.php?id=602
www.free-eco.org/articleDisplay.php?id=590
www.free-eco.org/articleDisplay.php?id=589
www.free-eco.org/articleDisplay.php?id=580
www.free-eco.org/articleDisplay.php?id=561
www.free-eco.org/articleDisplay.php?id=558
www.free-eco.org/articleDisplay.php?id=554
Freedom Works – www.freedomworks.org
www.freedomworks.org/about/about-freedomworks
www.freedomworks.org/publications/top-10-reasons-to-oppose-cap-and-trade (03-06-09)
www.freedomworks.org/publications/do-green-mandates-and-subsidies-create-jobs
(09-25-07)
www.freedomworks.org/publications/a-warm-and-fuzzy-feeling (11-16-06)
www.freedomworks.org/publications/whos-afraid-of-scientific-methods (08-21-05)
www.freedomworks.org/publications/cooler-heads-coalition (06-21-05)
Heartland Institute – www.heartland.org
www.heartland.org/about/
www.heartland.org/policybot/results/26481/Has_Global_Warming_Been_Responsible_f
or_any_Changes_in_Global_Tropical_Cyclone_Frequency_and_Intensity_Answe
r_NO.html (
www.heartland.org/publications/environment%20climate/article/25791/Falling_Temperat
ures_Confound_Alarmists.html (09-01-09)
www.heartland.org/full/25446/Third_International_Conference_on_Climate_Change_Op
ening_Remarks.html (06-02-09)
www.heartland.org/publications/environment%20climate/article/24739/Global_Cooling_
Continues.html (03-01-09)
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www.heartland.org/policybot/results/24445/Ten_Global_Warming_Truths_to_Keep_Us_
Sane_in_2009.html (01-05-09)
Heritage Foundation – www.heritage.org
www.heritage.org/About
www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/wm2572.cfm (08-03-09)
www.heritage.org/Research/tradeandeconomicfreedom/wm2408.cfm (04-24-09)
www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/sr0031.cfm (12-08-08)
www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/wm1897.cfm (04-18-08)
www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/bg2075.cfm (10-11-07)
www.heritage.org/Research/EnergyandEnvironment/wm1403.cfm (03-21-07)
Hoover Institution – www.hoover.org
www.hoover.org/about/
www.hoover.org/publications/definingideas/62947262.html (Hoover Digest, 2009, No.1)
www.hoover.org/publications/digest/13871177.html (Hoover Digest, 2008, No.1)
www.hoover.org/publications/digest/13872437.html (Hoover Digest, 2008, No.1)
www.hoover.org/publications/digest/7465767.html (Hoover Digest, 2007, No.2)
www.hoover.org/publications/digest/7465857.html (Hoover Digest, 2007, No.2)
www.hoover.org/publications/digest/7465817.html (Hoover Digest, 2007, No.2)
Marshall Institute – www.marshall.org
www.marshall.org/category.php?id=6
www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/729.pdf (07-23-09)
www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/636.pdf (03-02-09)
www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/577.pdf (02-18-08)
www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/340.pdf (09-01-05)
www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/222.pdf (05-27-04)
www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/89.pdf (August 2002)
National Center for Policy Analysis – www.ncpa.org
www.ncpa.org/pdfs/GlobalWarmingPrimer.pdf (2007)
www.ncpa.org/pdfs/st324.pdf (09-30-09)
www.ncpa.org/pdfs/ba646.pdf (02-24-09)
www.ncpa.org/pdfs/ba644.pdf (02-18-09)
www.ncpa.org/pdfs/ba634.pdf (10-02-08)
www.ncpa.org/pdfs/ba617.pdf (05-14-08)
www.ncpa.org/pdfs/ba609.pdf (02-18-08)
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www.ncpa.org/sub/dpd/index.php?Article_ID=14894 (08-15-07)
www.ncpa.org/pdfs/ba570.pdf (09-08-06)
www.ncpa.org/pdfs/ba561.pdf (06-22-06)
National Center for Public Policy Research – www.nationalcenter.org
www.nationalcenter.org/NCPPRHist.html
www.nationalcenter.org/2009/12/church-of-global-warming.html (12-16-09)
www.nationalcenter.org/2009/10/next-big-cure-for-global-warming.html (10-08-09)
www.nationalcenter.org/2009/02/profiting-from-global-warming.html (02-18-09)
www.nationalcenter.org/2009/01/global-warming-news-roundup.html (01-28-09)
www.nationalcenter.org/2007/11/australia-john-howard-global-warming.html (11-25-07)
www.nationalcenter.org/2007/11/warming-is-non-event-manufactured.html (11-08-2007)
www.nationalcenter.org/2007/07/silly-global-warming-news.html (07-14-07)
www.nationalcenter.org/NPA553_GlobalWarming_Intolerance.html (April 2007)
www.nationalcenter.org/2006/06/some-global-warming-scare-tactics-are.html (06-21-06)
www.nationalcenter.org/2006/02/independent-finds-yet-another.html (02-12-06)
Pacific Research Institute – www.pacificresearch.org
www.pacificresearch.org/about/default.asp
liberty.pacificresearch.org/publications/changing-the-climate-for-peer-review (01-19-10)
liberty.pacificresearch.org/publications/the-costs-and-uncertainties-of-carbon-reductionschemes (11-17-09)
liberty.pacificresearch.org/publications/climate-modeling-is-far-from-a-precise-science
(08-18-09)
liberty.pacificresearch.org/publications/california-counts-the-cost-on-climate-changelegislation (07-21-09)
liberty.pacificresearch.org/publications/will-the-epa-have-a-cow (12-16-08)
liberty.pacificresearch.org/publications/be-careful-what-you-wish-for-hardship-of-highgasoline-prices-previews-the-impact-of-emission-controls (07-15-08)
liberty.pacificresearch.org/publications/federal-judge-did-right-to-dump-californiaemissions-lawsuit (10-16-07)
liberty.pacificresearch.org/docLib/20070924_Hysteria_History.pdf (09-24-07)
liberty.pacificresearch.org/publications/cool-news-on-climate-change (08-15-07)
liberty.pacificresearch.org/publications/the-problem-with-carbon-dioxide-regulation
(06-15-07)
Reason Foundation – reason.org
reason.org/about/
reason.org/news/show/global-warming-and-melting-ice (12-29-09)
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reason.org/news/show/hide-the-decline (12-16-09)
reason.org/news/show/when-science-becomes-a-casualt (12-14-09)
reason.org/news/show/whats-the-best-way-to-handle-f (12-08-09)
reason.org/news/show/is-government-action-worse-tha (09-09-09)
reason.org/news/show/global-warming-keeping-propert (06-12-08)
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